Introduction.
The relation of relative interpretability between axiomatic theories (formulated in first order logic) has been used to prove relative consistency results, decidability and undecidability of theories, and to compare the strength of theories.
Intuitively 'T interprets S' means that the language of S is translatable into the language of Tin such a way that T proves the translation of every axiom of S (as in 52.1). For example Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) interprets Peano arithmetic (PA).
Let T be a theory which has a reasonable notion of natural numbers and finite sequences (say T is what Pudlak [I 1, p. 4351 calls a 'sequential theory'). Suppose also that T satisfies 'full induction', namely, for every formula d(x) in the language of T, T proves that if there is a natural number satisfying the formula O(x), then there is a least such number. Typical examples are Z F and PA, but not Godel-Bernays set theory GB (which does not satisfy full induction). By (an easy generalization of) a theorem of Orey, T interprets S if and only if for every finite subtheory S' of S, T proves that S' is consistent (here S is a recursively axiomatized theory). It follows in particular that if a sequential theory T satisfies full induction, then T is not finitely axiomatizable. (Proof: clearly T interprets T. If T were finitely axiomatizable, then by Orey's theorem T would prove the consistency of itself, contradicting Godel's second incompleteness theorem.) For finitely axiomatizable sequential theories there is a theorem of Harvey Friedman (see [7] or [14] ) that gives a similar characterization of interpretability in terms of consistency: let T and S be finitely axiomatized sequential theories, then T interprets S iff the theory Id, + EXP proves that the consistency of T (with respect to cut-free proofs) implies the consistency of S (with respect to cut-free proofs). We recall that 'Id,' is the fragment of PA obtained by restricting the induction scheme to do-formulas, and 'EXP' is the assertion that the exponential function '2"' is total.
Friedman's and Orey's theorems provide a characterization of interpretability for a large class of sequential theories, but they do not say anything about theories which do not have a good notion of finite sequences and natural numbers, for example the theory of real closed fields (which is not in the scope of our investigation).
In this paper we use the language of modal logic to give an axiomatic treatment of interpretability similar to and extending the corresponding axiomatic treatment of provability carried out by Solovay in [16] .
We need to fix a 'base' theory T satisfying the hypothesis of Orey's theorem and such that T does not prove false cY-assertions (e.g. PA or ZF). Any such theory will work, but for simplicity we take PA as our base theory.
The modal language of interpretability, in addition to the usual modal operator 'a', has a binary modal operator 'D' standing for the relation of interpretability over PA. More precisely we consider interpretations of the modal language into the language of PA such that if the modal formulas A and B are interpreted as the PAsentences u and P, then the formula A D B is interpreted as a formalization of the assertion 'PA + a interprets PA + P', and the modal formula UA is interpreted as a formalization of 'PA proves a'. We make use of Orey's theorem to give an axiomatization and a decision procedure for the class of those modal formulas that express valid interpretability and provability principles (for every assignment of the atomic modal formulas to sentences of PA).
It turns out that if one replaces the base theory PA with a (strong enough) finitely axiomatizable sequential theory (e.g. ACA, of GB),then one gets a different modal logic. (The completeness of this logic with respect to interpretations in ACA, and GB has been proved by A. Visser and C. Smorynski and uses Friedman's characterization of interpretability.) For example the modal formula A D B -+ O(A D B) is valid if the base theory is finitely axiomatizable (this depends on the fact that if T is finitely axiomatizable, then the set {(u,p) 1 T + u interprets T + /J' ) is recursively enumerable), but it is not valid if the base theory is PA. On the other hand the formula A D B -t (A A OD) D (B A OD) (Montagna's principle) is valid for PA but not for the finitely axiomatizable theory GB. This sensitivity to the base theory shows that the modal language of interpretability is considerably stronger than the modal language of provability (which does not distinguish between PA or GB).
of T (with the same free variables), such that for every a,, . . . , a nE A S , Af k 4(a1,. . . , a n ) * J@ b 4(a1,.. . ,aJf.
Since we are assuming that the equality sign is interpreted as the identity relation, we can stipulate that (x = y)" is the formula 'x = y '. If there is an interpretation of TI in T2 we say that T2 interprets T,, or that TI is (relatively) interpretable in T2 . For example Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) interprets Peano arithmetic (PA). If T2 interprets T, via J; then clearly T2 t -a f for every axiom u of TI. A possible generalization of the above definition is given by the notion of 'ndimensional interpretation'. This is obtained by allowing the underlying set of the interpreted model A f to be a finite Cartesian product of copies of J@. The typical example is the bi-dimensional interpretation of planar elementary Euclidean geometry into the theory of the real numbers. It is easy to see that for theories which have a definable pairing function (like PA), n-dimensional interpretability is equivalent to one-dimensional interpretability.
Another generalization is obtained by relaxing the requirement that '(x = y)f' is 'x = y', in order to allow the underlying set of the interpreted structure to be a set of equivalence classes of elements from A . However for the theories in which we are mainly interested, namely extensions of PA in the same language, one can use the induction axioms to replace each equivalence class (with respect to =f) with its least representative, thus obtaining an interpretation which preserves the equality. (The same holds for any sequential theory satisfying full induction; however for theories without full induction it might actually be important to consider interpretations with equivalence classes.) 2.2. Peano arithmetic: the basic setting. We assume that the reader is familiar with the formalization of syntax in Peano arithmetic (PA) and with Godel's incompleteness results. We recall however the basic definitions and theorems.
PA has nonlogical symbols 0, s, +, -, for zero, successor, addition, and multiplication. The closed terms ' O' , 's(O)', 's(s(O))', . . ., are called numerals and 'n' denotes the nth numeral.
We denote by 'o' the set of the natural numbers, which we identity with the first infinite ordinal number. If we consider o together with the element zero and the operations of successor, addition, and multiplication, we obtain the standard model of PA. So the interpretation of the numeral n in o is the natural number n.
Every model J@ of PA has an initial segment isomorphic to o , which we still denote by 'o'. Given a E A , we say that a is a standard element of A if a E o ; otherwise we say that a is a nonstandard element of J@. A model not isomorphic to o is called a nonstandard model.
A finite sequence of symbols from the alphabet of PA is called a 'syntactical object'. So a formula, a term, or a proof, are syntactical objects. To each syntactical object t is associated bijectively (in an effective way) a natural number '6, called its 'Godel number '. The function which sends the natural number n to (the Godel number of) its numeral n is primitive recursive, so given a model A + PA this function can be . . . ,x,) numerates the relation R in T if for all n,, . . . ,n, E o , R(n,, . . . ,n,) o T t -cc(n,, . . . ,n,). 3. u(xl,. . . ,x,) binumerates R in T if it numerates R in T and, in addition,
THEOREM 2.2 (GODEL). For every primitive recursive predicate R there is a formula u(R) which binumerates R in PA.
In the above theorem the formula a(?) can be constructed explicitly from a primitive recursive definition of the predicate R. The formulas so obtained are called primitive recursive formulas, or p.r.-formulas for short (cf. [6, p. 531 Every recursively enumerable set can be defined (in o)by a Cy-formula, and conversely every Cy-formula defines a recursively enumerable set.
2.3.
Formalization of metamathematics in PA. The version of the diagonal lemma that we need is the following: THEOREM 2.4 (Diagonal lemma). For every formula 4(x1,.. . ,x,, y), there is a formula u(x,, . . . ,x,) such that PA t Vrt-(a(?)o 4(2, '~1)).
The formula u is defined in a primitive recursive way 'relative to 4'; in particular if 4 is a primitive recursive formula, then so is cc (up to provable equivalence in PA).
Given an arithmetically axiomatized theory T (in the language of PA), we can associate to T, in a uniform way, a formula Prf,(x, y) which formalizes the predicate 'y is a proof of x from T'. An important remark is that Prf,(x, y) depends not only on the set of axioms of T, but on the way these are given, namely on the formula z(x) defining this set. So a less ambiguous notation would be 'Prf,(x, y)'. Alternatively we can think of an arithmetically axiomatized theory as coming together with the formula defining its set of axioms. The formula Pr,(x) ('x is a theorem of 7 ' ) is defined as 3yPrf,(x, y), and Con(z) is i Pr,('O = 11).
It is known that the set of (the Godel numbers of) those sentences of PA which are 'true' (in o ) is not arithmetically definable. (This is an immediate consequence of the 'diagonal lemma'.) On the other hand, for every fixed n > 0, there is a Ct-formula 'True,;(x)' which defines the set of (the Godel numbers of) the true Ct-sentences of PA. Moreover PA proves that True,;(x) has the properties that a truth definition should have; in particular, for every u E c: , PA I -a -Tr ue,;('al).
Let n E o,,fl+ PA, and let $ E be such that A i = '$ E 2:' . Since n is a standard element of A, 4 is (the code of) a formula with standard quantifier complexity. Note that 4 might still contain terms of nonstandard length (as computed in A!), and therefore it is not necessarily (the code of) a standard sentence; however the partial truth definitions can be used to assign ameaning to the assertion that $ holds in , &Z.
It can be proved by induction on the complexity of u that whenever a E Cy and o l= r , then PA t r . The same result can be proved also model-theoretically by observing that the Cy-formulas are preserved upwards from one model to any endextension (so in particular from o to any model of PA). However the syntactical proof has the advantage that it can be formalized in PA. This yields: THEOREM 2.5 (Provable 2:-completeness of PA). PA proves (a formalization of) (for every $, if $ is a true 2:-sentence, then PA I-4'. Given a formula a(x), we let a 1 y be the formula o(x) A x < y. Similarly given a theory S, we let S r n be the finite subtheory of S axiomatized by all the axioms of S with Godel number <n. So if a(x) defines a theory S, a 1 n defines S 1n. PA, is defined as PA 1 k. If T is a finite theory, there is a canonical formula defining T, namely the formula [T](x) obtained by taking the disjunction of all the formulas of the form x = n such that n is (the Godel number of) an axiom of T. An application of the partial truth definitions (and the cut elimination theorem) is that PA proves the C:-soundness (hence the consistency) of every finite subtheory of itself (cf [lo] Godel's completeness theorem says that every consistent theory has a model. From Henkin's proof of the completeness theorem it is easy to see that if T is an arithmetically definable consistent theory (in a finite language), then T has an arithmetically definable model A,in the sense that the underlying set of the model is a definable set of integers, and the relations and functions of the model are arithmetically definable. In fact A can be constructed in a recursive way from T and an oracle for O' , and the whole construction can be formalized in PA. Noting that a definable model is essentially an interpretation, we obtain the following formalized version of the completeness theorem (cf. [6, p. 721 
The following theorem of Orey has been presented for the first time in [6, p. 801 (in a slightly weaker version). THEOREM 2.9 (OREY). Let T be a theory containing PA, and let S be a theory with a recursively enumerable set of axioms. Suppose that for every Jinite subtheory S' of S,
PROOF. By Craig's theorem we can assume that S is primitive recursively axiomatized. Let a(x) be a primitive recursive formula which binumerates S in PA.
Let o*(x) be the formula o(x) A Con(o 1 x + 1). In other words a * defines the union of all the consistent subtheories of a of the form o 1 y. By formalizing the proof of the compactness theorem in PA, we obtain PA t-Con(o*). Since a(x) binumerates S, the hypothesis of the theorem can be restated as Vk T t Con(a r k). If T is consistent this implies that o*(x) numerates (actually 'binumerates') S in T (on the other hand, if T is inconsistent there is nothing to prove). Therefore, by the arithmetized completeness theorem, T interprets S. QED. REMARK 2.10. If T is formulated in the language of PA (and contains PA), then the converse of Orey's theorem is also true: Suppose that T interprets S and S' is a finite subtheory of S. Then there must be a finite subtheory T ' of T such that T' interprets St. For finitely axiomatized theories, the interpretability relation can be formalized as a Cy-statement; thus, by the Cy-completeness of PA, PA t 'T' interprets St', and therefore PA t-
Since T is an extension of PA in the same language, by the reflection theorem T t -Con([T']). Thus
REMARK 2.11. Orey's theorem and its converse continue to hold for every sequential theory satisfying 'full induction' (see the Introduction). Any such theory admits partial truth definitions and proves the cut elimination theorem; hence it is not finitely axiomatizable (by a version of the reflection theorem). . . . , u,) such that (u, = O)f, u, = y, and, for all i < x, (u,, ,= By the induction axioms it follows that for every x E , K there is a ~( u , ) )~. (unique) y in ,Kf such that I= G(x, y). Let g(x) be the unique element y E &KS such that + G(x, y). Then ASI= g(x + 1) = g(x) + 1, and g is an embedding of as a submodel of A S . (It is easy to see that the embedding g preserves + and x.) The sentence Vx, u(u < x + 1 -+ u < x v u = x) is a theorem of PA, and therefore it is true in ,&ZS. Therefore
It follows by induction on x E A that for every u E satisfying k= (u < g (~) )~, there is some y < x, in , &Z, such that , &Z I= (u = This means that g embeds g (~) )~. A as an initial segment of A S . QED. THEOREM 2.13. Let cr and b be sentences of PA. Then PA + a interprets PA + j ifS every model of PA + a has an end-extension which is a model of PA + b.
PROOF. The '*' part follows immediately from the previous theorem. Conversely, if PA + sc does not interpret PA + P, by Orey's theorem there is some k such that PA + sc F Con(PA, + P). Take a model A of PA + cc in which i C o n ( P A k + P) holds. Being a Cy-assertion, i Con(PAk+ b) must then hold in any end-extension 01G of A . But then by the reflection theorem U11 cannot be a model of PA + P. QED.
Doing model theory inside PA.
The theorem just proved is not directly formalizable in PA, since it speaks about models and a model is in general an infinite object. However it is formalizable and provable in the conservative extension of PA known as ACA,. DEFINITION 2.14. ACA, is a first order theory formulated in a language properly containing the language of PA. It has two sorts of variables, set variables X, Y,. .. ,and numerical variables x, y,. . . (this can be translated into the usual formalization of first order logic with just one sort of variables by adding a unary predicate for 'x is a set'). We also have a binary relation 'x E X' whose intended meaning is that the number x is an element of the set X. The axioms of ACA, are the following:
1. All the axioms of PA except the induction scheme.
be a formula containing no bound set variables ($(x) might contain several free variables both of the number sort and of the set sort), and let X be a set variable not occurring in $. Then there is an axiom which asserts the universal closure of 3XVx(x E X ct $(x)).
Every model 4 of PA can be expanded to a model of ACA, by interpreting the set variables as ranging over the definable subset of A (with parameters), and by interpreting 'E' as the usual membership relation. This construction also shows that ACA, is conservative over PA; that is, every sentence in the language of PA which is provable in ACA, is already provable in PA.
When working inside ACA, we stipulate that a 'model' consists of an underlying set, together with the various relations and functions of the model; and, in addition to that, we also require that a model contains the satisfaction relation for its structure. We also need to take care of the following minor point: in ACA, there is a set which is not properly included in any other set, namely {x / x = x). Consequently embeddings of models cannot always be replaced by inclusions (we thank Professor P. Hajek for this remark). To avoid this problem we stipulate that whenever we say "end-extension" we really mean "isomorphic to an end-extension". With this proviso it is easy to verify that the proof of Theorem 2.13 can be formalized in ACA, : THEOREM 2.15. ACA, proves the following: PA + ci interprets PA + i f every model of PA + cc has an end-extension which is a model of PA + j.
It is also well known that in ACA, one can carry out Henkin's proof of Godel's completeness theorem. Now let dl be a model of PA, and suppose that V k dlk Con(PAk+ 4). By
Orey's theorem the theory of dlinterprets the theory PA + 4, and therefore there is an end-extension % of dl(namely the interpreted structure) which is a model of PA + 4. It is not difficult to verify that this construction can be formalized in ACA, and can be extended to the case in which 4 is allowed to contain nonstandard terms (as computed in A ) . So we get: THEOREM 2. 16 . ACA, proves the following. Let dlbe a model of PA, let @(x)be a formula, and let m be an element of
Note that the (possibly nonstandard) term 'm' has the same meaning in dland in %. This is so because the evaluation function eval that sends the (Godel number of the) term 'm' to its denotation 'm' is primitive recursive, and therefore gives the same output in A and in %. (The same would be true if we start with any closed term t rather than the numeral m.) Note that by Orey's theorem and its converse 'PA + I) interprets PA + X' is equivalent to the IIg-assertion 'Vk PA + I) t-Con(PAk + 31) ' . (An analysis of the proof shows that this equivalence is provable in PA.) DEFINITION 3. 3 . We say that a modal formula A is PA-valid if, for every interpretation f , Af is a theorem of PA. We say that A is o-valid if, for every interpretation f , Af is true (namely, it holds in the standard model a).
Note that A is PA-valid if and only if O A is w-valid. Also note that every PAvalid formula is also o-valid.
It is worth mentioning that provability is definable in terms of interpretability;
namely, the formula A t ,( 1 A) D Iis PA-valid. If we wished we could have used this equivalence to define q in terms of D, omitting q from the modal language altogether. DEFINITION 3.4 . The modal theory L is formulated in the language of provability 9 ( 0 ) and is axiomatized by all the tautologies (including those containing the O-operator) plus the following axiom schemes: In [16] Solovay gave the following axioplatizations for the valid formulas of the language of provability 9 ( 0 ) :
In Solovay's original paper the theory L is called 'G'. We use here the terminology of [5] .
In The axioms. The 'soundness' part was already known, and amounts to noticing that all the axioms are PA-valid and the rules of inference preserve PA-validity. Axiom 1, for example, is a formalization of the deduction theorem. Axiom 2 is a formalization of Lob's theorem (a statement essentially equivalent to a formalization of Godel's second incompleteness theorem). To prove it, work in PA and assume that ( 0 A ) f fails, that is, PA t+ A*; then PA + i Af is a consistent theory and therefore does not prove its own consistency: PA + i Af P C?n(PA + -1 A*). But this is equivalent to PA t+ ('PA I --Af' + Af), namely i (O(OA -t A))*. Axiom 3 is an expression of the provable C7-completeness of PA: in fact, reasoning in PA, if the C:-assertion ( 0 A)f holds, then it must be provable, namely (uoA)*. Axiom 7 says that relative interpretability yields relative consistency results. Axiom 8 is the arithmetized completeness theorem: PA plus the assertion that a given theory is consistent interprets the given theory. Axiom 9 (Montagna's principle) is a consequence of Orey's theorem; an easy way to prove it is to make use of Theorem 2.13: PA + ci interprets PA + P if and only if every model of PA + ci has an end-extension which is a model of PA + P; Montagna's principle now follows immediately from the observation that the 27-sentence (OD)* must be preserved upwards under endextensions. Theorem 2.13 can also be used to verify axiom 6 (although there is a more elementary proof). The other axioms are easy to verify.
To obtain a characterization of the o-valid formulas we have to add to ILM some ,axioms that are o-valid but not PA-valid. The simplest example is tHe scheme OA + A asserting the soundness of PA. This yields the theory ILM" defined as follows: DEFINITION 3.9 (The theory ILM"). The axioms of the theory ILM" are all the theorems of ILM plus all the instances of the axiom scheme q A + A. The only rule of inference of ILM" is modus ponens. In $6 we will prove the following: THEOREM 3.10 (Arithmetical completeness of ILM"). The o-valid formulas are exactly the theorems of ILM".
De Jongh and Veltman [5] proved that the theory ILM is decidable. ILM" is also decidable, since the proof of our results will show that ILM" can be recursively reduced to ILM (Theorem 6.5). So we have a decision procedure for the classes of the PA-valid and o-valid formulas. Moreover, if a formula is not PA-valid (or ovalid), we will be able to construct an explicit counterexample.
3.1. Plan of the proof. The main ingredient in the proof of our results is a systematic procedure to build arithmetical interpretations to provide the needed counterexamples. The general plan is the following: if ILM F A , then we have already remarked that A is PA-valid. On the other hand, if ILM t ? A, then by the results of [5] and [I81 (which we present below) there is a Kripke-like model V of ILM in which A fails; at this point we will be able to apply our procedure to transform V into an arithmetical interpretation 'I7,the induced interpretation, such that PA t+ A' . A similar construction will show that if ILM" b' A, then A is not w-valid.
$4. Semantics for interpretability logic.
The situation is the following: to prove the decidability of ILM de Jongh and Veltman showed that ILM is complete with respect to a certain class of 'Kripke-like' finite models which they called 'ILMmodels'. The finiteness of the models is what establishes the decidability. We will give an exposition of their proof in Appendix A. In [IS] Visser showed that ILM is also complete with respect to a different class of models, the 'simplified ILM-models' (which, although simpler, are no longer finite). Visser's simplified models are obtained by expanding each ILM-model into an equivalent simplified ILM-model in a certain primitive recursive manner (the elements of the induced simplified model are finite sequences of elements of the ILM-model, as explained in Appendix B). For the purposes of our work we found it more convenient to make use of the simplified ILM-models, which we define in this section. As a preliminary step we begin by defining the models for the logic L of provability (those employed by Solovay for the proof of Theorem 3.6). 
Note that the reverse well-foundedness of R implies in particular that R is antireflexive: Vx E V(ixRx). Sometimes we will call the elements of V 'worlds' or 'nodes'. For a proof of this theorem we refer the reader to [4] or [16] . 
Recursiveness of Visser's simplified models.
The simplified models needed for the completeness theorem of ILM cannot be taken to be finite. (In a private communication Visser constructed a modal formula that has an infinite simplified model but not a finite one.) However, we will show that they can be taken to be 'primitive recursive', which is almost as good for proving that certain relations are absolute for models of PA. DEFINITION 4.9. We say that (V, R, S, b, k) is a primitive recursive ILM-model if it is a simplified ILM-model with the following additional properties:
1. V is a primitive recursive set of natural numbers (in the sense that the characteristic function of V is primitive recursive).
2. R and S are primitive recursive binary relations on V. 3 . The relation {(x, A) / x 1 1A} is primitive recursive (here A ranges over all the modal formulas and is not restricted to be atomic). A ySz A z B ) . Then Q is a primitive recursive relation. 5 . The following strengthening of the well-foundedness property of R holds: there is a natural number k such that every (finite) sequence x , R x , K has length I k.
Let Q = { ( x , y , B ) 132:xRz
Clearly any finite ILM-model is primitive recursive.
In the following when we refer to a primitive recursive ILM-model V we will always assume that V is given together with an explicit primitive recursive definition of V, R, S, the forcing relation, and the predicate Q. By abuse of terminology we will denote by 'V', 'R', 'S', 'IF, and 'Q', both the relations and the formulas of PA corresponding to the respective primitive recursive definitions. According to the general plan of the proof (see $3.1) we need to define an interpretation 'I' of Y(D) into the language of PA, the induced interpretation, such that whenever 1 A, then PA H A'. We will define in PA a constant L (depending on V) and then define I in terms of L as follows: DEFINITION 5.2. For A atomic, A'is the sentence of PA expressing the following: ( 1 S) L is the limit of the function F: o -t V u {O),and for all n, m if n I m, then F(n)SF(m).
In the following we will omit the boldface notation for numerals when the meaning is clear from the context. So we will write Con(PA + L = y) rather than Con(PA + L = y).
Thus, by property (R), for all x E V PA + L = x is consistent (as ORx). Of course PA + L = 0 is also consistent because L = 0 holds in the standard model. REMARK 5. 4 . Note that if V is finite, then the first three properties of F are equivalent to the assertion that, for every x, y, z E V u {0},
The equivalence can be shown by observing that for V finite, the assertion 'PA k Vx E V I)' is equivalent to 'Vx E V PA t-I)', and therefore we can bring all the quantifiers restricted to V outside of the scope of the provability predicate. (For the third property we also need to use Orey's theorem.) 5.3 . Proof that the properties of F imply the main result. Assume that for every provably primitive recursive ILM-model V we can define F (and L) possessing the above properties. We will show how to derive the main result from this assumption. DEFINITION 5.5. Let A be a modal formula. Working in PA, we say that I is faithful on A if for all x E V we have 1. if x It A and L = x, then A' , and 2. if x ltiA and L = x, then iA' .
It is clear that I is faithful on atomic formulas. We will show that for all C, PA proves that I is faithful on C. Once we have done this we can prove the main result as follows: if ILM P A, then there is a provably primitive recursive ILM-model V with root ~E V , such that b I t i A . Thus P A + L = b k i A 1 . But P A + L = b is consistent. So PA I + A' , and we are done.
In the proof of the following lemma we will use Theorem 2.15: PA + a interprets PA + Piff every model of PA + cc has an end-extension which is a model of PA + P.
We will invoke this theorem while working in PA; this use of models in PA is justified by the fact that the above characterization of interpretability is provable in the theory ACA,, which is a conservative extension of PA. We will also make use of Theorem 2.16 (with the same justification).
LEMMA 5.6 . For all C, PA proves that I is faithful on C. 
Claim 1. There is an element y E Y such that Y t" xRy A y A.
To prove the claim we take y to be the unique element of CV such that Y + L = y.
Since x E V,L = x, and Y + L = y, by property ( 1 R ) we must have xRy. To show that Y t" y 1 A, we use one of the induction hypothesis: PA F 'I is faithful on A'.
(There is a subtle point here: we are now working in PA but the induction hypothesis was assumed outside of PA. However, the induction hypothesis is a Cy-assertion, namely the assertion that something is provable, so it holds inside PA as well. To reach a contradiction we will show that 2 t" PA + B'. Since 'z I t B' is a Cy-assertion, being true in Y it must hold in its end-extension 9. By the induction hypothesis PA F 'I is faithful on B', so 9+ 'I is faithful on B'; therefore from the fact that 9+ L = z A z (tB we can conclude that 9+ B' , which is the desired contradiction.
Part 2. Work in PA. Assume x E V, x I t i ( A D B), and L = x. So there is some y E V such that xRy A y A A i3~ E V(xRw A ySw A \t3I t B).
We must prove that PA + A' does not interpret PA + B'. To prove this it is enough to find a model Y of PA + A' which does not have any end-extension 9which is a model of PA + B'. We claim that any model Y of PA + L = y has the desired properties. First of all, notice that since L = x and xRy, it follows that PA + L = y is consistent (by property ( R ) ) ; so PA + L = y indeed has a model, GY say. We need to show that Y t" PA + A'. Since ' y 1 A' is a true Cy-assertion, it must hold inside the model GY as well. By the induction hypothesis, PA t 'I is faithful on A'; so Y + 'I is faithful on A'. Therefore from the fact that + L = y A y It A we can conclude that Y + A'. Now suppose by contradiction that Y has an end-extension 9which is a model of PA + B'. We will prove:
To prove this, first note that 9must satisfy all the Cy-formulas which are true in Y, so 2 t" y E Range(F); hence, by property ( i s ) , 9+ ySz. By our choice of y we have i 3w E V(xRw A ySw A w ItB). In the ILM-model that we are considering this last assertion is primitive recursive, so it must be satisfied in the model 2. In particular, taking w = z, we find that 2 k (z I t iB). By induction hypothesis PA k 'I is faithful on B'. So 2 k iBB'. Absurd. OED. 5.4 . The definition of F. To finish the proof of the main result we have to define F. The definition will involve the Godel number of the formula defining its limit L. The apparent circularity is handled by the diagonal lemma in the usual way. So let L = lim F if F has a limit, L = 0 otherwise. Before defining F we need some auxiliary definitions: DEFINITION 5.7. Let x E V. We define the rank of x at stage n, rank(x, n), as the least number i I n such that there is a proof of Godel number I n of L # x from PA,. If i does not exist we define rank(x, n) to be the ordinal number o.
Intuitively, the smaller rank(x, n) is, the more inconsistent is the fact that L = x. It is clear that after a suitable coding of the ordinals I o the rank function can be coded as a primitive recursive function, and its definition can be formalized in PA. Note that for a fixed x, rank(x,n) is a nonincreasing function of n (with respect to the natural ordering of the ordinals I o), and its To define F we need to fix a (provably) infinitely repetitive primitive recursive coding of the elements of V u (0); for example we can set: 'n codes y' if, by definition, 3x I n: n = 2"(2y + 1). DEFINITION 5.8 . We define F(0) = 0. Suppose F(m) has been defined for every m < n. Let x = F(n). We define F(n + 1) as follows:
1. Suppose that n codes an element y in V u (0) such that xRy and rank(y, n) < o.
Define F(n + 1) = y.
2. Suppose that n codes an element y in V u (0) such that i x R y and xSy. Suppose that rank(y, n) < rank(x, n). Note that if the rank of an element at stage n is less than o , then it is less or equal to n. In particular, rank(y, n) I n. So a = F(rank(y, n)) has already been defined. If aRy, we define F(n + 1) = y. 3 . In the remaining cases we define F(n + 1) = F(n). EXAMPLE 5.9. As an intuitive illustration consider the simplified ILM-model of Example 4.7 with four nodes 1, 2, 3, 4. First notice that F: o + V u (0) is only allowed to move along the R-arrows or the S-arrows. If xRy, then to move from x to y, F only needs to see an inconsistency from PA + L = y. This will ensure that PA f L = x k Con(PA + L = y) (as in Solovay's proof of the arithmetical completeness theorem for provability logic). On the other hand, to make an S-move, F needs to see a proof of an inconsistency from PA, + L = y for a suitably small i. Consider the following situation: if F ever reaches the node 3, then it is certain that F will never assume the value 1 afterward. It will follow that PA + L = 3 k iCon(PA + L = 1).
For the nodes 3 and 4 the matter is more complicated. We have i (3R4), so we need to show that PA + L = 3 t iCon(PA + L = 4). The trouble is that since there is an S-arrow from 3 to 4, it is not excluded that F will move from 3 to 4 (in some model), so we have conflicting requirements. The possibility of moving from 3 to 4 is needed to ensure that every model of PA + L = 1 thinks that PA + L = 3 interprets PA + L = 4 (or equivalently Vk PA + L = 3 k Con(PA, + L = 4)). The idea is to allow a move from 3 to 4 but to make it so difficult that we still have PA + L = 3 t iCon(PA + L = 4). The situation is further complicated by the fact that in any model of PA + L = 2 we do not want that PA + L = 3 interprets PA + L -4 (in these models we want instead that PA + L = 3 is consistent and PA + L = 4 is not). The solution is to allow a move from 3 to 4 at stage n only if the element a = rank(4 n) is so small that F(a) E (0, I), namely F was still confined to the set {0,1) at stage a (we also need rank(4,n) < rank (3,n) ). This 'confinement' is automatically satisfied in any model of PA + L = 1, and so it does not constitute a restriction; on the other hand it is a serious restriction in any model
We will prove that F (and L) have the desired properties. The fact that F is a primitive recursive function is clear from the definition. It is also clear that if F has a limit, then L is the limit. PROPOSITION m + F(n)SF(m). 5.10 (PA) . n I PROOF. According to whicK of the three clauses in the definition of F is satisfied, one of the following must hold: F(n)RF(n + I), F(n)SF(n + I), or F(n) = F(n + 1). Now the thesis follows from the fact that R s S and S is reflexive and transitive. . QED. PROPOSITION 5.11 (PA) . F has a limit. PROOF. Since the model V might be infinite, this is not completely clear. We know however that there is some bound k such that every R-chain has length I k. Thus F cannot make more than k consecutive R-moves. Moreover, since xSyRz xRz, F cannot make more than k R-moves, whether they are consecutive or not. So after a certain stage, F is only allowed to make S-moves. But an S-move from a node x to a node y (at stage n) entails that the rank of y (at any stage bigger than n) is smaller than the rank of x (at stage n). So if F did not have a limit, we would have an infinite (definable) descending sequence of ranks, which is impossible. QED. PROPOSITION all x, y in V u {0), if L = x and xRy, then
(PA). For
Con(PA + L = y).
PROOF. Here we use the fact that xRy implies x # y. For a contradiction, suppose that xRy, L = x, and PA + L = y is inconsistent. Let n be such that n codes y and n is so large that: 1) F has already reached its limit x by stage n; 2) there is a proof of L # y from PA,, with Gijdel number less than n (thus rank(y, n) < o). The definition of F now entails that F(n + 1) = y. Absurd. QED. PROPOSITION 5.13 
For a contradiction, suppose that there is a model Y of PA and 3y E g such that CV + L = y A i x R y (as before, the use of models is justified by working in ACA,). Since 'x = F(k)' is a Cy-assertion, it must hold in GY as well. By Proposition 5.10, CV k xSy. In g consider the last step taken by F before reaching the limit y,-namely consider n and w with F(n) = w, w # y, and Qm > n F(m) = y. Since L = x, n must be a nonstandard element of @. In particular n > k (in @), so g I= xSwSy. We cannot have wRy, because this would imply xRy. Let a = F(rank(y,n)). By the definition of F we must have g k aRy.
If @ + k 5 rank(y,n), by Proposition 5.10 we would have @ k xSaRy; hence + xRy, contradicting our assumptions. So @ k rank(y, n) < k, and therefore 
. But then g thinks that for all sufficiently large m, rank(z, m) l k. On the other hand, since k is a standard element of @, by the reflection theorem @ thinks that the theory PA, + L = y is consistent, and therefore Vm rank(y, m) > k. Let n be such that F has already reached its limit y by stage n, n codes z, and rank(z, n) I k.
In particular, @ I= rank(z, n) < rank(y, n). To reach a contradiction we will show that @ I= F(n + 1) = z. Let r E @ be such that @ k r = rank(z, n). Note that r I k, so r must be a standard element of @ (although n might be nonstandard). Therefore we can compute, outside of g, the element a = F(r). Since L= x, this implies that aSx (by Proposition 5.10); hence by absoluteness @!= aSx. Now using the property aSxRz +aRz, we can conlude, in @, that aRz. But now clause 2 in the definition of F ensures that F will make an S-move from y to z at stage n, namely @ + F(n + 1) = z, which is the desired contradiction. QED.
'
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.8.
Arithmetical completeness of ILM".
In this section we prove that the w-valid modal formulas are exactly the theorems of ILM". DEFINITION = (V, R, S, b, t ) be a simplified ILM-6.1 (Sound models). Let V model and let C be a modal formula. We say that V is C-sound if: The proof is similar to the proof of the corresponding Lemma 5.6 with some minor modifications. Consider the crucial case D = A D B. The only possible source of trouble in adapting the proof is that property (i R )might no longer be applicable in the present context, since we are now dealing with all the nodes in V u ( 0 )rather than restricting our attention only to those nodes which are in V. The only places in the proof of Lemma 5.6 where we used property (i R )were isolated in two claims:
1. There is an element y E CV such that CV t" xRy A y A.
In the context of Lemma 5.6 these claims were proved under the assumption that x E V. In the present context we have the weaker assumption x E V u (01, but we can use the soundness property. We recall that the first claim was proved taking y E CV such that GY k L = y and noting that since L = x and x E V, by property ( i R ) we must have CV + xRy. In the present context we can still say that CV t" ( y A) (using GY k A' and the o-faithfulness on A); however if x = 0, nothing excludes the possibility that y = 0 and we cannot conclude that ?! / k xRy. But since V is C-sound, 0 IF A iff 1 A. Thus in the unfortunate case that L = 0 and CV t" L = 0 we can take y = 1 and we still have CV + xRy A y It A, as desired.
To prove the second claim in the case when x = 0 we first notice that exactly the same argument as in the old proof shows that 2 + z z V A ySz. But z E V implies ORz, so we are done (we did not even use the soundness property). T(C) and 1 I t iC. The fact that 1 ItT(C) simply means that V is C-sound. Therefore, extending V by adding a new root 0 (as explained above), we have 0 I t iC.
Since the interpretation I is o-faithful on C, PA + L = 0 k i C'. But in the standard model L = 0; thus o I= i C' and C is not w-valid. QED. We recall that ILM" is defined as the modal theory whose axioms are all the theorems of ILM plus all the formulas of the form O A -+ A, and whose sole rule of inference is modus ponens. An immediate corollary of the above theorem is that the o-valid formulas are exactly the theorems of ILM". This completes the proof of Theorem 3.10. EXAMPLE 6.6. In [9] Lindstrijm shows that there are two sentences a and P such that PA interprets both PA + a and PA + P but it does not interpret PA + a A P, and moreover PA does not interpret either PA + i cc or PA + i P and yet it does interpret PA + i a v i P. This can be alternatively proved using the arithmetical completeness theorem for ILM" as follows. Let 
Concludingremarks.
It is easy to verify that Theorem 3.8 continues to hold if we replace the base theory PA by any sequential theory T which satisfies full induction (as explained in the Introduction) and such that T does not prove false @-statements (this hypothesis was implicitly used in Remark 5.3). Actually it is enough to assume that T does not prove false 2;-statements, since this implies that T does not prove false Hi-statements. In particular our results hold for ZermeloFraenkel set theory. To carry out the proof, Theorem 2.13 (A D B) . Visser and Smorynski [I81 proved that ILP is the interpretability logic of the finitely axiomatizable theories GB and ACA,. (Namely, ILP k A iff for every interpretation f based on GB, GB k AS; similarly for ACA, .) To explain the soundness of the new axiom it is enough to observe that for a fixed finitely axiomatizable theory T the complexity of the assertion 'T + a interprets T + /3' is Cy (as cr and /3 range over sentences of T); therefore its truth implies its provability. (For T = PA the corresponding assertion is Z7; by Orey's theorem.)
Let SUPEXP be a formalization of the assertion that superexponentiation is a total function. (On input n this function yields a stack of n two's with an n on top. This rate of growth is needed to prove the cut elimination theorem.) In 1191 Visser generalized the completeness theorem for GB and ACA, to any finitely axiomatizable sequential theory T containing Id, + SUPEXP which does not prove false Cy-sentences (actually it suffices that T does not prove its own 'iterated inconsistency' for any number of iterations).
It is still open what is the interpretability logic of weaker theories: De Jongh and
Veltman found an example showing that the interpretability logic of Id, + EXP properly extends ILP. Visser's result shows in particular that the language of interpretability logic is still too weak to distinguish between, say, IC, and GB, despite the fact that the latter theory is a predicative extension of an essentially reflexive theory (ZF) and the ' former is not.
This and other considerations (like Rosser's sentences) raise the issue of expanding the modal language to obtain stronger results.
An obvious try in this direction would be the introduction of quantifiers over numbers (as in OVxA(x) -+ VxOA(x)). However Vardanyan 1171 proved that this leads to an undecidable set of PA-valid formulas (even without the D-operator), and Artemov [I] showed that the corresponding set of w-valid formulas is not even arithmetical. In [3] we proved that Vardanyan's undecidability result still holds even if we restrict the interpretation of the atomic modal formulas to belong to the set C : .
(Although we get new provability principles, like A + OA.)
A different approach would be that of expanding the language with the introduction of quantifiers over proposition. We do not know whether this leads to an undecidable theory; if it does, probably some restricted version of this proposal is more feasible: for example one could introduce a new modal operator 'I!', A third possibility that has already proved useful in the study of the modal logic of provability (see for example Carlson's completeness theorem in [15, p. 2061 ) is to have simultaneously in the modal language different provability and interpretability predicates corresponding to different base theories.
For other open problems we refer the reader to [18] .
all the D's are in X (possibly n = 0). . We call -A the pseudonegation of A. Let Uobe the closure of @, under subformulas, and let U be the closure of Uo under pseudonegations. Then U is closed under both subformulas and pseudonegations. Let X be the union of an infinite sequence of sets X o ,XI, X,, . . . , where Xo is U and X,+, is the union of X,, and the set of all the formulas of the form F A O i G, with F, G E X,, which are not L-equivalent to any formula in X,. Clearly X is closed under the function f (G,B ) = G A O i B up to provable equivalence in L. By the previous lemma X is finite. Now let Finally, let @, be the closure of Q2 under subformulas and pseudonegations. We claim that @, is a finite adequate set containing @, .
To prove this we need the following facts that can be easily proved by induction on n:
1. If a formula of the form B D C is a subformula of a formula in X,,then Given a set of modal formulas r , we write r F A if there is a finite conjunction C of formulas from r such that ILM F C + A. We say that r is ILM-consistent if r K 1. In the following discussion we consider a fixed finite adequate set @ and we let 'r' and 'A' denote maximal ILM-consistent subsets of @. DEFINITION A. 6 . We write r i A (A is a successor of r)iff: Given a pair w = (A,r), we denote by (w), and (w), the first and the second component of w respectively. Define R on W, as follows: wRw' o (w), <(w'), A (w), G (w'),. We say that u is a C-critical R-successor of w if (u) , is a C-critical successor of (w), and (u), has the form (w), * (C) * z (so C is uniquely determined (. . .x We have thus proved Theorem B.3. We will show that the model W' is provably primitive recursive (see Definition 4.10) . It is clear that the construction of the bisimulating simplified ILM-model W' can be carried out in PA and that the relations S' and R' are primitive recursive. It is also clear that the forcing relation 'It' is primitive recursive, since it can be reduced to the forcing relation on a finite ILMmodel: (x,, .. . ,x,) IF A o x, A (this follows from the fact that the two models bisimulate). Therefore it only remains to prove that the formalization of the relation '3Z(IR1Z A jS'Z A Z IF B)' is equivalent in PA to a primitive recursive formula. This will follow from the fact that we can give a bound on the length of the witness Z as follows: PROPOSITION P(1, j,Z) be the relation IR'Z A jS'Z A Z IVB. Then B. 8. Let there is a number k (independent of B, k and j ) such that i f 32: P(I,j,Z), then 32': P(I,j,Z) A IZI I 1 j 1 + k.
PROOF. Suppose that Z is a sequence of minimal length such that P(I, j, 5). Let t = I WI + 1. By the pigeonhole principle, in any sequence of elements from W of length t there is a repetition. Z is an end-extension of j, so we can write Z = j * ii.
Now we write ii as a concatenation of sequences of length t (except possibly the last one, which might have length < t). Since W is finite, we can find a number k such that if liil > k, then there will be one sequence s' which occurs at least 3 times in this decomposition of ii. We claim that the second occurrence of S can be replaced by a shorter sequence, thus contradicting the minimality of Z. To see this we first notice that in S there must be a repetition; namely, there must be two occurrences of the same element a E W.To obtain a shorter sequence we can now delete (in the second occurrence of S) one of the two occurrences of a together with all the elements of S that occur between these two occurrences of a. The fact that this process does not lead outside of the underlying set W' is guaranteed by the fact that for every node that we deleted there is an earlier occurrence of the same node (the one occurring in the first occurrence of S) that we did not delete. We need to verify that the R-step witnessing the fact that jR'Z is not destroyed after the shortening of Z. In fact if this R-step happened in the portion of Z that we deleted, namely in the second occurrence of S, then the corresponding step which happens in the third occurrence of S will work as well as a witness. QED. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.11.
